12 famous exploits. Shape checks, not replays.
For each famous exploit below, HexRail encodes a static-analysis pattern that fires when code has a similar shape. These are not full exploit replays — they don't prove a contract is vulnerable, and they don't prove we'd have caught the original hack. They flag shape-level similarity so a reviewer can look closer.
Shape checks · live
6
Shape checks · partial
6
Combined losses
$3.04B
Bybit
Stolen
$1.46B
What went wrong
Safe{Wallet}'s S3-hosted frontend bundle was tampered to display a legit tx while signing a malicious one to Ledger hardware wallets. The vulnerability was in the deploy pipeline, not in any Solidity contract.
What HexRail checks
Workflow files (.github/workflows/*) using actions pinned to mutable refs (@main, @master, version tags) instead of full commit SHAs.
cp-hack-bybit-unpinned-action-checkout
Ronin Bridge
Stolen
$625M
What went wrong
5-of-9 validator set where 4 were operated by Sky Mavis and 1 was a 'temporarily' delegated key never revoked. Single team compromise reached the threshold.
What HexRail checks
Bridge contracts with hardcoded signature thresholds in the 4-6 range — flagged as concentration risk relative to common deployments.
cp-hack-ronin-low-validator-threshold
Euler Finance
Stolen
$197M
What went wrong
donateToReserves() let an attacker artificially push their own account into an unhealthy state, then self-liquidate at a discount.
What HexRail checks
Donate-shaped functions in lending/vault contexts. Real exploit requires checking the health-calc + liquidation path, which a regex cannot reason about — flagged for manual review.
cp-hack-euler-donate-self-liquidation
Beanstalk
Stolen
$182M
What went wrong
Governance proposals could be executed in the same block they passed. Attacker flash-loaned BEAN, voted yes on a self-draining proposal, executed atomically.
What HexRail checks
execute / propose-and-execute functions without timelock keywords or block.timestamp checks in the immediate context.
cp-hack-beanstalk-instant-governance
Multichain
Stolen
$126M
What went wrong
Bridge admin keys controlled by a single person (the CEO). When detained, attackers (or insiders) drained MPC-controlled addresses.
What HexRail checks
Bridge withdraw / unlock / mint functions gated only by onlyOwner/onlyAdmin with no multisig or threshold keywords nearby.
cp-hack-multichain-single-admin-bridge
Curve Finance
Stolen
$73M
What went wrong
Vyper 0.2.15 – 0.3.0 generated broken reentrancy locks. Multiple pools were exploitable even though source code used @nonreentrant correctly.
What HexRail checks
Vyper @version directives pinned to 0.2.15, 0.2.16, or 0.3.0. Deterministic check on the version string — no ambiguity.
cp-hack-curve-vyper-version
Radiant Capital
Stolen
$53M
What went wrong
INLETDRIFT malware on a developer machine intercepted the Gnosis Safe UI mid-signature. Three multisig members signed a malicious tx believing it was legit.
What HexRail checks
transferOwnership functions with no two-step / Ownable2Step pattern and no timelock in adjacent context.
cp-hack-radiant-immediate-ownership-transfer
zkSync Airdrop
Stolen
$5M
What went wrong
An admin key was compromised. The attacker called sweepUnclaimed() to mint 111M tokens in a single transaction. No timelock or multisig was required.
What HexRail checks
Functions named sweep* / drain* / rescue* / emergencyWithdraw* / forceMint* gated only by onlyOwner or onlyAdmin.
cp-hack-zksync-admin-sweep-no-timelock
Cream Finance
Stolen
$130M
What went wrong
Collateral price computed from spot vault share supply. Attacker flash-loaned to inflate share supply, the oracle reported the manipulated value, and the attacker borrowed against fictitious collateral.
What HexRail checks
Pricing functions that compute totalSupply × X or balanceOf × X without TWAP or Chainlink fallback nearby.
cp-hack-cream-spot-share-pricing
Wormhole
Stolen
$325M
What went wrong
Guardian signature verification path used a stub set lookup with no strict hash check. Forged signatures against an empty / default set were accepted.
What HexRail checks
ecrecover usage in signature verification paths without an adjacent setHash / guardianSet equality check.
cp-hack-wormhole-unchecked-signature-set
Nomad Bridge
Stolen
$190M
What went wrong
An upgrade initialised the trusted-root mapping to 0x00. Any message with a zero-bytes proof became 'valid'. 300+ copy-paste attackers drained the bridge within hours.
What HexRail checks
Trusted-root / merkle-root lookups that don't explicitly reject the zero hash before treating it as a valid proof anchor.
cp-hack-nomad-zero-root-acceptance
Mango Markets
Stolen
$114M
What went wrong
Mango used a thin spot-AMM oracle for MNGO collateral. The attacker pumped MNGO price ~10× via CEX wash trades, the oracle reported it, and they borrowed $114M.
What HexRail checks
Borrowing / liquidation functions reading getPrice / latestAnswer with no TWAP, deviation, or staleness check in the immediate context.
cp-hack-mango-single-source-oracle
The honest version: A “shape check” here means a pattern that fires when code looks structurally similar to the cited exploit. It is not a proof that the exploit is reachable, and it is not a guarantee HexRail would have caught the original. Pattern matching is fast and cheap; it is not symbolic execution, and it does not catch business-logic bugs. Partial means the rule covers part of the exploit chain — treat as “manual review needed.”
Run a shape check against all 12 patterns
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